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Attempts to domesticate both formal symbolic notation
1 and probability theory
2 to 
the description of legal proof have a long history.  Until fairly recently, however, 
such  attempts  as  were  made  can  be  regarded  as  significantly  off  the  main 
intellectual track for the bulk of theorists and academic commentators, to say 
nothing of judges and practitioners.  Things began to change significantly in 1968 
with the publication of John Kaplan’s watershed article invoking the economics 
model and management tool called decision theory as a possible model for legal 
evidence  and  inference.
3  T h i s  a r t i c l e  w a s  f o l l o w e d  i n  f a i r l y  s h o r t  o r d e r  b y  
Finkelstein and Fairley,
4 and by Laurence Tribe’s cautionary rejoinder,
5 which set 
the  pot  bubbling  for  a  generation  of  then-young  evidence  scholars.    The 
implications (vel non) of Bayes’ theorem and of the asserted differences between 
“objective” and “subjective” probabilities for the theory of evidence and inference 
in legal proceedings became the dominant theme of nearly two decades of  legal 
scholarship from the late 1970s to the mid 1990s, much of the later work dealing 
with the tensions between the formal Bayesian accounts and the power of the 
emerging “story model” of human information processing, and with such vexed 
1  Wigmore’s “chart” method of inference mapping , originally outlined in 1913, is well known.  
See  JOHN  HENRY  WIGMORE,  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDICIAL  PROOF  AS  GIVEN  BY  LOGIC, 
PSYCHOLOGY AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS, 744-58 (1913).  
By far the most ambitious program of symbolization is to be found in JEROME MICHAEL AND 
MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROOF: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LOGICAL, LEGAL,
AND EMPIRICAL ASPECTS OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1931).  However, this work was privately 
printed, and merely précised in the two-part law review article based on it, Jerome Michael and 
Mortimer J. Adler, The Trial of an Issue of Fact, (pts 1&2) 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1224, 1462 (1934) 
so that their system of symbolization was of limited circulation and even more limited impact.  For 
the curious, the original full treatment is now available in the Hein-on-Line treatise database.   
2 The earliest explicit attempt to assimilate formal probability theory to evidence and proof in 
English appears to be Appendix I of Best’s 1844 treatise on  “presumptions,”  WILLIAM M. BEST, 
A  TREATISE  ON  PRESUMPTIONS  OF  LAW  AND  FACT, W I T H  T H E  THEORY  AND  RULES  OF 
PRESUMPTIVE  OR  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES,  353-58  (1844).    It  is  an 
acknowledged borrowing of LaPlace’s similar attempts in French a quarter century earlier. It is 
perhaps  telling  that  this  invocation  of  formal  probability  theory  was  to  be  found  only  in  an 
appendix.  However, that was more than any other evidence work in English for well over a 
century.    
3  John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968). 
4  Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970). 
5  Lawrence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. 
L. REV. 1329 (1971).
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6  For more than a decade now, those fights 
have  subsided,
7 n o t  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  a  s y n t h e t i c  c o n s e n s u s ,  b u t  
because other perhaps more immediately pressing issues have seized the focus of 
the academy, such things as the nature and control of asserted expertise in the 
courtroom, and confrontation after Crawford.  But the old fires still burn beneath 
the surface.  Many of the original players are still on the scene, and newcomers 
are  looking  to  be  heard  when  the  time  is  right.    However,  it  may  come  as 
something of a surprise that last summer, on a listserv restricted to academics in 
evidence,
8 a seemingly innocuous thread concerning the anticipated effects of the 
“restyled” versions of the Federal Rules of Evidence morphed into a full-throated 
exchange concerning the very foundations of the concepts of evidence, inference 
and relevance itself, featuring some of the established voices from the height of 
the “Bayes Wars,” and some significant new ones to boot.  All in all, it was just 
too good to let it languish as a bygone thread on a restricted listserv, so we have, 
with the permission of all involved, lightly edited the exchanges, and present them 
here.  The participants have been invited to supply whatever footnotes they wish 
for their remarks, but with the exception of the correction of a few infelicities of 
spelling and the like, they appear here in all their spontaneity as they crackled 
back and forth like summer lightning in late August and early September of 2009.   
Michael Risinger 
    T HE EXCHANGE: 
ROGER PARK: 
The restyled rules are available online   
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proposed0809/EV Rules.pdf.   
They are definitely a stylistic improvement over the existing rules.  I wish 
the rules had been styled this way from the beginning.  It’s not clear that it’s 
6  The  general  outlines  are  well  reported  in  Roger  C.  Park  and  Michael  J.  Saks,  Evidence 
Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 984-995 
(2006). 
7 At least in the pages of most American law reviews. Contributions to the debates have been more 
likely to be seen in specialized journals such as LAW, PROBABILITY AND RISK, and in specialized 
volumes such as HENDRIK KAPTEIN, HENRY PRAKKEN AND BART VERHEIJ, EDS, LEGAL EVIDENCE 
AND PROOF:  STATISTICS, STORIES, LOGIC (2009).  
8  Moderated by Professor Roger C. Park, evid-fac-l@chicagokent.kentlaw.edu.  
at:
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decision has already been made.  We aren’t the first.   It’s already happened to the 
rules of civil procedure, criminal procedure, and appellate procedure.        
The  restylers  didn’t  like the  word  “shall.”    The  substitutes  are  “must,” 
“may,” and “should.”  Thus, in Rule 609(a)(2) the restyled rule states that the 
evidence  “must”  be  admitted.    In  Rule 104(b),  the  requirement  that  the  court 
“shall”  admit the  evidence  (when  the  foundation  fact  has  been  established  by 
evidence sufficient to support a finding) has been changed to a statement that the 
court “may” admit the evidence.   
It’s true that judges are free to exclude evidence that passes 104(b) but 
flunks 403, so in that sense the original phrase “shall admit” may have been an 
overstatement.    So  far  as  I  know,  this  feature  of  the  original  didn’t  cause  a 
problem,  and  the  original  version  seems  stronger  than  the  restyled  version  in 
indicating that even if the judge does not believe the factual condition to be true, 
she is obliged to let in the evidence if a reasonable jury could believe it to be true.  
Does this change border on being a substantive change?  
[Professor  Park  responded  to  a  suggestion  that  the  new  language  is 
consistent with existing law because even if evidence satisfies the requirements of 
Rule 104(b), it could still be excluded on other grounds, such as hearsay or undue 
prejudice, as follows]:  
I still think that restyled rule 104(b) does not spell out the limited power of the 
judge.  Because of the “may” language, it could be read to mean that the judge has 
discretion to reject the evidence when the judge does not believe that the factual 
condition  has  been  established,  even  there  is  evidence  sufficient  to  support  a 
finding. 
Here is the current restyled rule 104(b): 
(b)    Relevancy  Depends  on  a  Fact.    When  the  relevancy  of  evidence 
depends on fulfilling a factual condition, the court may admit it on, or 
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding that 
the condition is fulfilled. 
Below is a suggested revision.  I am not at all confident that it is bullet-
proof, but perhaps it at least suggests a possible direction for a different approach. 
(b)  Relevancy Depends on a Fact.  When the basis for objecting to 
an item of evidence is that it is irrelevant in the absence of proof 
that a factual condition linking it to the case has been fulfilled, then 
the  court  must  admit  the  evidence  on,  or  subject  to,  the 
introduction  of  evidence  sufficient  to  support  a  finding  that  the 
condition is fulfilled. 
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the inconsistency between the way the word “relevancy” is used in Rule 104(b) 
and the way it is used in Rule 401, this further step could be taken: 
(b)  Probative Value Depends Upon a Fact.  When the basis for 
objecting to an item of evidence is that it has insufficient probative 
value in the absence of proof that a factual condition linking it to 
the case has been fulfilled, then the court must admit the evidence 
on, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support 
a finding that the condition is fulfilled. 
PETER TILLERS: 
Roger,  
Your  suggested  revision  may  imply  that  the  trial  court  does  not  have  the 
discretion to rule that the evidence of the factual condition must be presented to 
the trial court before the conditionally relevant evidence is admitted.  Although 
there may be some disagreement about this, I think the conventional larnin’ is that 
the trial may permit the foundational evidence to be presented later but that it 
need not do so.     
ROGER PARK: 
I  agree,  that’s  a  possible  defect.    The  same  defect  exists  in  the  present  (pre-
restyled) rule providing that the evidence “shall” be admitted upon or subject to 
the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a verdict.  The defect doesn’t 
seem to have caused a problem, and if it did cause a problem, then changing the 
rule  to  fix  the  problem  would  exceed  the  mandate  of  the  restylers  (it  would 
change the law in one of the circuits).    
My version isn’t crystal clear on the point, and I guess the fix would be to 
say  that  the  judge  must adm it the evidence “o n” th e in tro duction of evidence 
sufficient  to  support  a  finding  and  may a d m i t  t h e  e v i d e n c e  “ s u b j e c t  t o ”  t h e  
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding. 
PETER TILLERS TO ROGER PARK: 
Yes, that's quite true. Then one must figure out if the original version of the rule 
was  infelicitously  written  or  whether  something  else  was  afoot.    Sometimes 
infelicitous language masks indecision.  Sometimes not.   
4 International Commentary on Evidence Vol. 8, No. 1, Article 1
Brought to you by | Harvard University
Authenticated | 128.103.149.52
Download Date | 8/14/13 9:59 PMROGER PARK TO PETER TILLERS: 
Personally,  I  would  prefer  a  longer,  less  formal,  more  discursive  rule  about 
linking  evidence  into  a  case  by  proving  a  foundation  fact,  perhaps  even  one 
including an example.  However, the chance of such a change being adopted is so 
remote that I won’t take the trouble of drafting it. 
The current rule 104(b) means nothing to students by itself, and I doubt 
that my change cures that.  The addition of the “linking it to the case” language is 
an attempt to make it a bit clearer by using the link metaphor, but it probably is 
not enough to do the job. 
FREDERICK MOSS: 
How about: 
104(b).   When the relevancy of evidence depends on fulfilling [? 
“proof of”] a factual condition, the court [, subject to the other 
Rules,] [shall] admit it on the introduction of evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the condition is fulfilled.  The court may 
admit it subject to the later introduction of evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the condition is fulfilled. 
This eliminates the problem with Roger’s suggestion that seems to require 
the judge to “conditionally admit” evidence subject to being “connected up.”   It 
also notes what is probably obvious and unnecessary, that to be admitted the item 
of evidence must also not be excluded by other rules.  This is a bit wordy, but 
clearer, I think. 
FREDERICK MOSS: 
The Moss suggestion cleaned up a bit: 
104(b).   When the relevancy of evidence depends on fulfilling [? 
“proof of”] a factual condition, the court [, subject to the other 
Rules,] [shall] admit it on the introduction of evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the condition is fulfilled.  The court may 
admit it subject to the later fulfillment of the condition. 
5 Park et al.: Bayes Wars Redivivus — An Exchange
Brought to you by | Harvard University
Authenticated | 128.103.149.52
Download Date | 8/14/13 9:59 PMMICHAEL RISINGER: 
Dear Roger, 
I  don't  think  that  there  in  fact  is an  inconsistency  between  104(b)  and  401—
merely that both are looking at slightly different parts of the same elephant, and 
both are to an extent incoherent, but not necessarily inconsistent.  I think 104(b) 
should be clarified by indicating that all relevancy is conditioned on fact, but that 
104(b) only applies when the proponent’s theory of relevance is dependent on an 
adjudicative fact not subject to either judicial or jury notice without admissible 
evidence.  I do not think that would be inconsistent with the original intendment 
of the rule, but given the welter of judicial opinions, which I myself am not very 
conversant with (and really have little desire to be) maybe it would seem to the 
restylers  to  be  inconsistent  with  at  least  some  lines  of  (incoherent)  judicial 
analysis. 
PETER TILLERS: 
Dear Michael, 
If I understand your point (and I think I do), I agree with you.  I think you already 
know  the  general  position  I  take  about  conditional  relevance:    I  think  ALL 
evidence is, conceptually speaking, only conditionally relevant (and conditionally 
probative).   
This  is  not  to  say  that  Federal  Rule  of  Evidence  104(b)  satisfactorily 
solves  the  problem  of  how  the  law  should  handle  conditionally  relevant  and 
conditionally probative evidence.  The sources of the difficulty are familiar to 
you.  One is, again, precisely that all evidence is conditionally relevant but Rule 
104(b),  as  interpreted  and  applied,  assumes  that  only  a  subset  of  evidence  is 
conditionally  relevant  and  probative.    But,  of  course,  it  does  not  necessarily 
follow  that  Rule  104(b)  should  be  applied  to  all  offered  evidence.    (The 
administrative difficulties alone would be nightmarish.)  Indeed, it is not even 
clear, again for reasons familiar to you, that Rule 104(b) as presently written 
should be applied to ANY offered evidence:  the law’s treatment & understanding 
of inference networks is a jumble—and perhaps for that reason alone it might be 
better to abolish R 104(b)—as long as people don’t forget that such abolition of 
the legal rule won’t make inference networks (the phenomenon of conditionally 
relevant and probative evidence) go away. 
Those are my two bits. 
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David  Kaye  long  ago  argued—I  think  he  was  the  first  to  do  so,  but  I’m  not 
completely  sure—that  Federal  Rule  of  Evidence  401  embodies  (I  would  say 
“perfectly embodies”) an idea that is an integral part of Bayesian analysis, the 
idea that the effect of an “event” such as evidence is always only to alter a prior 
probability (or prior odds), that the relevance of evidence cannot be determined 
by the probability of the fact in issue that ensues once the evidence is given or 
known but that relevance depends only on whether there is a difference between 
the  prior  probability  and  the  posterior  probability  of  some  hypothesis  or 
possibility (here a possible “fact”), and that (hence) if the likelihood ratio is not 
“1” the evidence in question is relevant.  Of course, as we-all sophisticated folks 
know,  the  terms  “prior”  and  “posterior”  are  just  one  way  of  viewing  Bayes’ 
Theorem—the temporal factor is inessential and what counts is whether there is a 
difference  between  the  unconditional  probability—the  one  that  takes  the  form 
P(H)—and the conditional probability—the one that takes the form P(H|E).  (Of 
course, the super-super-sophisticated among us know or think that there is no 
such thing as an unconditional probability and that the appropriate comparison is 
between the probability P(H|B) and P(H|B & E)...where “E = evidence” and “B = 
background knowledge” or “everything else we know” or something of the sort.) 
David Kaye can say all of the above more elegantly than I can. 
It is sometimes said that the thirty years’ war over mathematical analysis 
of evidence is over.  If the war is over (is it? who won?), I think we should 
preserve  the  original  form  of  Rule  401  as  a  memorial  to  the  Bayesian  side 
(“sides”?) in that bitter struggle.  If objection were made that the original form of 
Rule  401  (the  current  version)  is  a  partisan  memorial  and  that  the  continued 
presence of such a partisan memorial would threaten to reignite bitter passions 
and quarrels, it should be noted that the drafters of Rule 401 had probably never 
heard the word “Bayes” or any of its variants.  (Perhaps they just had a lot of 
common sense.) 
By saying the above, I take no position, of course, on who was correct and 
who  was  incorrect  about  the  power  of  Bayesianism  for  analysis  of  “juridical 
evidence.”    If  nothing  else,  this  is  because  there  are  too  many  variants  of 
Bayesianism for any ordinary mortal to explain and justify any such assessment 
without writing an 800-page treatise.  The task of writing such a tome is better left 
to the mathematicians, logicians, and philosophes, who might be able to explain 
themselves in 150 pages rather than 800. 
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Peter, 
1.  I was not the first to use Bayes’ rule to illuminate Rule 401.  Rick Lempert's 
article, Modeling ﾠRelevance,  i s   a   m o d e l   o f   c l a r i t y   i n   p r e s e n t i n g   t h e   i d e a .     I   w i s h   I  
9
had  written  it,  though.    And  the  notion  that  relevance  involves  a  shift  in  the 
probability of a hypothesis has deeper roots. It is present, for instance, in John 
Maynard Keynes’s classic treatise on probability.
10 
2.   I do not think that the change in wording will make much difference, if 
only because some important treatises present the idea of a change in probability 
from before to after clearly enough
11  and the earlier phrasing will remain part of 
the  rule’s  history.    But  I  could  be  wrong.    The  more  concise  phrasing  could 
reinforce the tendency of writers not familiar with this literature to compare the 
wrong quantities when determining whether the probability shifts.
12   
PETER TILLERS: 
Until recently I used to introduce my Evidence students to Bayesianism.  After 
doing so, I would consider the possible limitations of Bayesianism.  Among the 
things I would say was the following: 
Other Limitations of the Standard Version of Bayes’ Theorem: 
There  are  two  other  possible  difficulties  with  Bayesian 
analysis that are worth mentioning now. These difficulties are of a 
less technical and a more substantive or fundamental sort. 
9 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977). 
10 I n  p r e s e n t i n g  a  l o g i c a l - r e l a t i o n  t h e o r y  o f  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  K e y n e s  w r o t e  t h a t  “ [ t ] h e  s i m p l e s t  
definition of Irrelevance is as follows: h1 is irrelevant to x on evidence h, if the probability of x on 
hh1 is the same as its probability on evidence h.“ J. M. KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 55 
(1921) (footnote omitted).  
11 E.g., 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). 
12  An example of this error can be found in Deborah Davis & William C. Follette, Rethinking the 
Probative Value of Evidence: Base Rates, Intuitive Profiling, and the "Postdiction" of Behavior, 
26 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 133 (2002). For some attempts to clarify the matter, see Richard D. 
Friedman & Roger C. Park, Sometimes What Everybody Thinks They Know Is True, 27 LAW & 
HUMAN BEHAV. 629 (2003); David H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Misquantification of 
Probative Value, 27 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 645 (2003); Gary L. Wells, Murder, Extramarital 
Affairs, and the Issue of Probative Value, 27 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 623 (2003). Davis and 
Follette defend their unusual interpretation of probative value in Toward an Empirical Approach 
to Evidentiary Ruling, 27 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 661 (2003).
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principles  or  generalizations  that  people  seem  to  use  to  support 
conclusions they draw from evidence.  For example, when jurors 
reason about the probative value of escape evidence, they probably 
say things like this: 
“I just don't think innocent people think of escaping from 
jail. They have faith in the criminal justice system and they 
are willing to take their chances.” 
or: 
“People  who  have  committed  crimes  are  very  likely  to 
escape from jail.  They are immoral people and they have 
no compunctions about breaking the law.” 
The equation that Lempert gives us doesn’t speak to the role of 
such  judgments.    And  yet  they  seem  to  be  very  important  for 
making judgments about the implications of evidence. 
Second, when people try to figure out what happened, they 
very often tell stories. For example, Juror A might say: 
“You know, I think what happened is that DD had a fight 
with his wife, he left the house in a huff, went to the bar, 
and shot the first person he saw.” 
Juror B: 
“I don't think that’s what happened at all.  I think after DD 
argued  with  his  wife  he  got  morose  and  depressed  and, 
unconsciously looking for a scapegoat, he began to stew 
about the insult by VV earlier that day.  DD then decided to 
kill VV, went to the bar, and shot VV in cold blood.” 
The  standard  version  of  Bayes’  Theorem  does  not  require  that  such 
scenarios  or  stories  be  formulated  when  the  force  of  evidence  on  factual 
hypotheses  is  evaluated.    But  it  is  possible  that  the  formation  of  stories  or 
scenarios is fundamental to reasoning about evidence.  What to do? 
Cf. Judea Pearl (causal hypotheses); cf. B. Robertson & A. Vignaux (all 
evidence is “trace evidence,” matter left by some physical, hence, causal process; 
hence, causal hypotheses are integral to evaluation of evidence). 
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I  certainly  would  never  object  to  maintaining  anything  as  a  memorial  to 
something dear to someone else’s heart, but I wonder how much either the old or 
the new language of FRE 401 bears on anything interestingly Bayesian.  It is true 
that the likelihood approach to relevance is, as Rick Lempert said many years ago 
and has repeated many times, a useful, and I would say powerful, heuristic that 
can advance one’s understanding of the inferential process, but it is difficult to see 
likelihood ratios as capturing the heart of the matter.  Consider a simple case:  a 
person accused of murder in a small town was seen driving to the small town at a 
time prior to the murder.  The prosecution’s theory is that he was driving there to 
commit the murder.  The defense theory is an alibi:  he was driving to the town 
because his mother lives there to visit her.  The probability of this evidence if he 
is guilty equals that if he is innocent, and thus the likelihood ratio is 1, and under 
what is suggested as the “Bayesian” analysis, it is therefore irrelevant.  Yet, every 
judge in every trial courtroom of the country would admit it, and I think everyone 
on this list would say it is relevant.  And so we have a puzzle. 
The puzzle is deeper, because again as everyone on this list knows, all 
evidence is contingent on the remainder of the evidence, and thus at the time any 
particular  question  of  admission  is  asked  one  can’t  have  any  idea  what  the 
likelihood ratio might be.  Evidence thought to be inculpatory might turn out to be 
exculpatory, and so on.  Indeed, much evidence has just the interesting aspect of 
my  example:   under  certain  assumptions  it  is  inculpatory  and  others  it  is 
exculpatory.   Is  all  such  evidence  then  irrelevant  also?   Hardly,  so  the  puzzle 
deepens. 
Some  of  the  puzzlement  is  reduced  if  the  trial  process is  looked  at  in 
explanatory rather than probabilistic terms, because then driving to the town is 
part  of  each  party’s  explanation,  and  thus  plainly  relevant.   Pardo  and  I  have 
written about this a bit and so I won’t belabor the point here. 
More generally, the likelihood ratio aspect of Bayesianism is not unique, 
nor even attributable to it.  It is simply an example of contrastive and counter-
factual reasoning, which has been with us since recorded history, I think (and I 
suspect even longer).  To this extent, as Peter suggests, Bayesian approaches and 
natural  reasoning  processes  may  overlap,  and  so  I  would  be  completely 
enthusiastic  about  keeping  the  old  language  of  FRE  401  as  a  memorial  to 
common  sense  (although  I’d  prefer  “tribute,”  since  “memorial”  has  certain 
implications about its present status). 
None of this, by the way, should be taken as inconsistent with what I said 
above about Bayesian approaches being powerful heuristics, and in some (but 
quite small) set of cases powerfully useful.   
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I’m not sure I understand Ron’s point.  
Suppose that the driving-to-town evidence is the prosecution’s first piece 
of evidence.  
The state of the evidence before this proffer is that we don’t know where 
the defendant was at the time of the murder.  After the proffer, we have good 
reason to believe he was in the town where the murder took place.  That increases 
the probability that he committed the murder.  
The fact that defendant then testifies to another explanation for being in 
town doesn’t change that.  Compared to no evidence about him being in town, the 
prosecution’s  driving-to-town  evidence  considered  together  with  the  defense 
counter-evidence  elicited by  it  makes  it  more  likely  that  he  committed  the 
murder.   
DAVID KAYE: 
I  think  Ron’s  point  is  that  the  value  of  a  likelihood  ratio  depends  on  other 
evidence  in  the  case,  beliefs  about  the  world,  and  assessments  of  competing 
explanations.  The particular example may not be the best for making this point, 
but the general observation is correct.  Probabilities do not spring into existence in 
isolation.  Any numbers are just the tip of an iceberg of thought.  In this sense, the 
ratio is not “the heart of the matter.”  How one arrives at it is crucial. 
The nice thing about the ratio, however, is that when it is arrived at in a 
satisfactory and reasonable way, it can clarify the degree of support that an item 
of evidence gives to one hypothesis over another.  Thus, I think the set of cases in 
which likelihood theory is at least somewhat helpful is quite large.  But the ratio is 
embedded in a much deeper and richer reasoning process, and I suspect that one’s 
characterization  of  its  value  depends  on  what  features  of  good  reasoning  one 
chooses to emphasize. 
I also think that the current wording of Rule 401—the emphasis on before 
and after—is to the good but that it is more directly supportive of a Bayesian 
perspective than a likelihood-ratio theory of probative value.  This remark may be 
cryptic, but, due to the crush of business at the start of the semester, I won’t try to 
elaborate. 
RONALD J. ALLEN: 
Just to clarify things, and then I’ll be silent, I think the awkwardness comes in 
trying to think of this in a likelihood, or degree of support, way.  Also, to be clear, 
I am by no means saying that neither approach can ever work.  Rather, I am 
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point—sure, one can hypothesize a case where things work through just fine, but 
suppose  the  defendant’s  opening  statement  was  that  he  was  there  visiting  his 
mother.  Now again the evidence is irrelevant.  One might say, but there is no 
evidence that he was there.  Okay, so now the state wants to ask this question, the 
defendant objects on relevancy grounds and asks to make an offer of proof.  He 
establishes to the court’s satisfaction that he will offer proof that he visited his 
mother.  On that showing, the state’s offer is irrelevant under what I will call just 
to  simplify  things  the  “Bayesian”  perspective.   Now,  this  result  is  perfectly 
ridiculous for lots of reasons, but the point is not—both sides will present the 
same evidence meaning the probability of it being presented (or however you 
want to formulate the question) conditional upon guilt or innocence is 1.0 and 
thus their ratio is 1.0, which means it is irrelevant.   
We can quibble with the example, but we can easily repair the example, 
even  though  I  think  it  makes  the  point  more  than  adequately.   Roger’s 
disagreement rests upon the assumption that presence is a contested fact, but in 
my hypothetical, and often in real cases, facts like this aren’t contested, or their 
implications are argued to cut in opposing directions.  None of this is a problem 
for an explanatory account of proof, but it does cause problems for a Bayesian 
account.   That’s  not  to  say  Bayesian  accounts  don’t  have  other  virtues  and 
explanatory accounts other problems.  Both are true, but I was responding to only 
this one issue. 
DAVID  KAYE: 
Let’s see.  The two hypotheses are Hp (D was in town and had the opportunity to 
kill the deceased), and Hd (D was in town to visit his mother and was with her at 
the time of the murder).  The evidence is E (D was seen driving into town before 
the murder).  E does not support Hp over Hd (the likelihood ratio LR is 1).  The 
witness’s testimony should be excluded as irrelevant—if the defendant represents 
that his theory of the case is Hd when the state proffers the evidence and if the 
state has no other reason for presenting E than refuting Hd. 
On the other hand, if D does not respond to the proffered evidence by 
conceding that he was in town at the pertinent time, and the issue is whether Hp is 
true as opposed to Hd' (D was out of town), then the LR is large (if the witness is 
not mistaken, of course).  Hence, E is relevant under the likelihood approach—it 
supports Hp over Hd'. 
Thus, I don’t see the awkwardness in the LR formulation as long as one is 
careful in specifying the hypotheses at issue—what the evidence is being used to 
prove (and disprove).  The LR forces one to do this because the probabilities in it 
are conditional on competing hypotheses. 
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uncontested facts listed in Old Chief v. United States.
13   To forestall a labored 
analysis that would address these, I am happy to stop and leave it to the readers to 
decide which ways to think about relevance and probative value are the most 
helpful, instructive, awkward, or complicated. 
RONALD J. ALLEN: 
Let’s see further.  Under David’s theory, evidence is relevant until one hears from 
the defendant, but then it might not be.  Unless, of course, the defendant presents 
such a strong response that the evidence becomes helpful to him, in which case it 
is relevant again.  Unless the state responds, in which case it may not be relevant 
any more.  And of course, if the evidence is a critical part of both parties’ case, 
it’s not relevant at all!  How could one not love such a misshapen child and think 
it anything but awkward?  Beats me.  Now, to be sure, “awkward” to some extent 
to me means how well our theories explain our observations—like trials, but it 
should be noted that David isn’t explaining them—or more accurately put, his 
explanation is false.  Pace David, the evidence is relevant regardless what D says.  
If the defendant agrees that he was there, the evidence is relevant even though it is 
a critical component of both cases (and the likelihood ratio is 1.0); if he disagrees 
it is relevant because it distinguishes the stories.  In both cases it has explanatory 
value.  And again, regardless what David thinks or his theory predicts, not a judge 
in the land would disagree.  Nor would anyone (perhaps excluding David) on this 
list,  I  suspect  (please  correct  me  if  I’m  wrong).   Of  course,  we  could  all  be 
deserving of disdainful rejection, I guess.  See, e.g., The Sane Society. 
The theory is deeply wrong in another sense.  My point was that it is 
difficult to determine relevancy until one has heard all the evidence and that the 
question  then  is  its  explanatory  value,  not  anything  much  having  to  do  with 
likelihoods or their cousins.  One way to understand David’s response is to agree 
to wait and see what the evidence is, what does the defendant claim, for example.  
But, after one has heard all the evidence, there are no likelihoods to form, but 
only, in Bayesian terms, priors, which are not informed by Bayesianism.  So, this 
move doesn’t work, either, leaving no defense except to recognize a misshapen 
child for what it is. 
If anybody is interested in any of this, and I infer from the quite limited 
range of participants that the answer is probably no, I’d be happy to communicate 
off line. 
13  519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
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I hesitate to get involved in this debate—especially with all the piles I see before 
my  just-back-from-vacation  eyes—but  I’ll  insert  one  oar  and  keep  quiet  and 
regret it. 
I  am  a  fan  of  Lempert’s  work  on  Bayesian  interpretation  of  probative 
value, but I think its value is something different than what it’s often said to be.  It 
is  most  useful  not  as  a  description  of  how  judges  or  jurors  should  evaluate 
evidence  but  of  how  lawyers  should  argue  the  probative  value  of  evidence—
which is (in my view) probably the most important thing we should be trying to 
teach. 
We can’t know how an item of evidence affects the likelihood of (say) a 
criminal defendant’s guilt.  As more than one writer on this list has pointed out, 
that depends on knowing many other facts about the case, some of which are 
never known in any case in which there’s a genuine dispute.  A brick is not a wall 
(all bow)—a great truth in this context—but what is the wall?  The most common 
description is that the wall is a story that describes the known and unknown facts 
of the case, a story of what happened.  If so, there are at least two implications to 
consider. 
1.    In  all  but  the  rarest  cases,  many  if  not  most  of  the  bricks  will  be 
inferred rather than observed (and if said to be observed, they may be contested).  
No news here. 
2.  A brick—let’s say an uncontested fact—may be a part of two or three 
or several walls.  
Item:  D is stopped in his car three minutes after an aborted bank robbery, 
1/2 a mile and speeding away from the site.  Prosecution says it’s relevant to guilt: 
it shows he was escaping.  Defendant says it is relevant to innocence: no escaping 
bank robber would speed and attract attention.  I used to be  a criminal defense 
lawyer, so I think the defendant’s argument is quite a bit more specious than the 
prosecutor’s; you may agree.  But I think almost any judge would let it in for 
either side, without going through this academic exercise, because it’s relevant in 
the context of the argument that side is making, and that’s enough pass the low 
threshold set by 401. 
More important item:  Defendant in a murder case is the dead victim’s 
son.  Is that relevant to show he’s guilty?  Is it relevant to show he’s innocent?  
The  answer  in  any  such  trial  will  be  Yes,  to  both  questions.    But  why  (as  a 
Bayesian matter)?  I don’t have a clue, although we can all come up with lots of 
scenarios—he loved his father and would never harm him, he hated his father’s 
guts, he lived with his father and therefore was nearby when someone else killed 
the old man, his father drove him crazy, and so forth.  As far as “relevance” goes, 
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advocate may try to sell to the jury, it better include this fact as a brick.  
My point—as I said at the start—is simply that the probative value of 
evidence  depends  on  its  place  in  the  argument  that  is  being  made.    It  is 
commonplace  in  trials  that some  uncontested  fact  is  held  up  plausibly  as 
convincing “evidence” for diametrically opposing positions.  
In that context, I try to use Bayesian logic to help my students figure out 
how to make strong arguments.  Ultimately these arguments are mostly in the 
form of “this uncontested fact would [almost] never have occurred unless the 
contested fact I’m arguing about is as I say it was,” and, in opposition “actually 
[given what we know—or infer] that uncontested fact would have happened as it 
did regardless of the other events we’re arguing about.”  In my own experience, 
some students are helped by restating these basic arguments in the formal terms of 
likelihood ratios.  In particular, it reminds them to think through the fundamental 
question: how likely would this fact be if reality were the opposite of what the 
proponent  claims?    For  others,  it’s  a  waste  of  time—I  hope  not  an  actual 
impediment—so  I  keep  it  short,  put  it  in  writing,  and  emphasize  verbal 
equivalents. 
But  I’m  drifting  away  from  the  main  point.   401  says  that  relevant 
evidence must make some proposition that matters more or less likely.  But no 
judge can know if it does, and if so which way it does; that depends on the other 
“facts” of the case—and on the tribunal’s evaluation of them.  It follows that in 
practice  “relevance”  must  be  an  aspect  of  argument,  not  of  observation  or 
calculation.  I doubt if many judges and lawyers consciously think this way, much 
less talk in these silly terms, but I submit that this is the unstated logic of the game 
they play. 
DAVID KAYE: 
Sam poses another interesting question. He writes: 
More  important  item:    Defendant  in  a  murder  case  is  the  dead 
victim’s son.  Is that relevant to show he’s guilty?  Is it relevant to 
show he’s innocent?  The answer in any such trial will be Yes, to 
both questions.  But why (as a Bayesian matter)?  I don’t have a 
clue, although we can all come up with lots of scenarios—he loved 
his father and would never harm him, he hated his father’s guts, he 
lived with his father and therefore was nearby when someone else 
killed the old man, his father drove him crazy, and so forth.  As far 
as “relevance” goes, it doesn’t matter:  the stark reality of the trial 
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better include this fact as a brick. 
A Bayesian could use Bayes’ nets to handle this.  That is, the Bayesian 
judge  (or  advocate)  could  generate  a  list  of  scenarios  (walls?)  with  prior 
probabilities worth considering.  In some, the defendant’s identity as the son will 
suggest guilt.  (It will be a node in a Bayes’ net linked to a material proposition 
that alters the probability of the latter proposition as computed without this node.)  
In others, it will suggest innocence.  In still others, it may have no impact on the 
posterior probability of the scenario or the material propositions embedded in it.  
The judge should treat the relationship as relevant under Rule 401 if there are one 
or more scenarios such that (1) a juror reasonably could worry about the scenario, 
and (2) a juror reasonably could believe that the defendant’s relationship as the 
son shifts the probability for the scenario or for any material propositions within 
it. 
This explanation is still a little rough, and it may not be exactly what I said 
in response to Ron’s example.  I am still thinking it through.  The point I made 
earlier was that judgments of relevance (under a likelihood theory, a Bayesian 
perspective, or anything else) must depend on where we are at in the trial and 
what positions the parties are known or expected to take.   
Returning to Sam’s question, it should be added that some facts are just 
presented for the sake of a rich and realistic narrative.  They can be part of a 
Bayes’  net,  but  their  relevance  need  not  flow  from  their  ability  to  shift  a 
probability.  We let a witness state his or her name, for example.  My citation to 
Old  Chief  v.  United  States
14 w a s  m e a n t  t o  r e c o g n i z e  t h i s  d i s t i n c t  c a t e g o r y  o f  
relevant evidence. 
I think this is as far I can go on this thread. 
RONALD  ALLEN: 
Let’s see again.  Sam Gross raises two issues.  First, that he hasn’t got a clue 
about which of the virtually infinite possible scenarios matter, what their prior 
probabilities  are,  and  not  mentioned  but  equally  distressing  what  the  various 
pertinent conditional probabilities might be, and second that the same piece of 
evidence  will  be  possibly  pertinent  to  lots  of  different  stories  with  opposing 
implications (the original issue we began discussing).  David’s response is that the 
Bayesian  judge  can  provide  the  very  scenarios  and  the  prior  and  conditional 
probabilities that Sam says he hasn’t got a clue about.  As David has said in other 
contexts, that’s a pretty neat trick.  In any event, one can always make things up 
14 519 U.S. 172 (1997) 
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nothing  peculiarly  Bayesian  about  that  (and—another  story—maybe  it 
unfortunately too often does characterize trials).  In any event, on the assumption 
that  you  don’t  know  all  these  things  that  Sam  doesn’t,  David’s  answer  isn’t 
terribly helpful, unless one believes in omniscient Bayesian judges (and jurors, I 
guess)  who  do  not  suffer  from  the  informational  vulnerabilities  that  we  mere 
mortals do.   David doesn’t address the second point, which as I say is where we 
began, and that is that the same piece of evidence can support both guilt and 
innocence, making the pertinent likelihood ratio 1.0.  In fact, many if not most 
trials have massively overlapping evidence.  The actual differences between the 
evidentiary proffers of the opposing sides often come to only a few points, yet 
judges consistently let all this overlapping evidence in for just the reason Sam 
identifies.  Thus, if the likelihood ratio approach to relevance were true in some 
sense, that means the trial judges throughout the country have been admitting 
massive amounts of irrelevant evidence.  Now, maybe that is true, but maybe it 
suggests  a  problem  with  the  theory.     FYI,  explanatory  accounts  of  juridical 
evidence  don’t  seem  to  me  at  any  rate  to  have  quite  the  same  problem  here 
(although as I said originally and will repeat, they have others).  Again, and like 
David, I will now retire from the scene. 
MICHAEL RISINGER: 
Dear All, 
Like Sam, I have hesitated to join this seemingly intractable debate.  I agree with 
Sam that knowledge of the theorem of the Reverend Bayes, perhaps translated 
from formal to ordinary language, is very useful in teaching argumentation.  I also 
think it is useful in disciplining inference.  But I don’t think it either maps on to 
the human inferential process very well, or that we should expect it to.  This 
failure to be captured by Bayes’ Theorem is not necessarily a criticism of the 
accuracy of the human inferential process tout court.  Formal systems are true 
within the bounds of their defining assumptions.  Bayes’ Theorem, like all formal 
systems, is incomplete, and in the case of Bayes’ Theorem, that incompleteness 
extends to important aspects of the process by which one piece of information 
bears on another—base rates of occurrence in the world being one, and how to 
define the reference set to which the base rate inquiry applies being another.  The 
reference set problem (or “reference class” problem as it tends to be known in the 
literature both in and outside of the law) has been usefully written about by Ron 
Allen and Michael Pardo, and their piece (Ronald J. Allen and Michael S. Pardo, 
The Problem of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUDIES 107 
(2007)) is a good introduction to it.  Jim Franklin, the Australian mathematician 
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concepts and reasoning before Pascal) is currently undertaking a major project 
examining the reference class problem and how to approach it—that is, rules, 
principles, or at least heuristics, for justification in defining reference classes and 
electing  one  possible  reference  class  over  another.   I’ve  written  a  little  about 
itmyself, and intend to do more in the future.  The reference class problem may 
prove  more  intractable  than  even  the  debate  about  Bayesianism,  but  some 
progress  can  be  made,  I  think,  concerning  more  and  less  justified  ways  of 
approaching it.  With no such explicit corralling of the reference class problem, 
Bayes’  Theorem  is  fairly  sterile  even  without  considering  the  well-known 
problem of “prior probabilities.”  In addition, our whole approach to relevance, as 
reflected in Rule 401, which I call the “god-view approach,” is fundamentally 
wrong.  In my opinion (as the Magliozzi brothers are accustomed to add on the 
end  of  any  such  cosmic  pronouncement).   It  fails  to  take  into  account  the 
knowledge state of the processor (factfinder) as well as the characteristics of the 
putative evidence, and the two considerations are in fact inseparable.  And now 
for the shameless self-promotion (as the Magliozzi brothers would further say):  I 
have written a little article that bears on all this entitled Inquiry, Relevance, Rules 
of Exclusion and Evidentiary Reform. It will be in the Brooklyn Law Review’s 
festschrift volume in honor of Margaret Berger.
 15   
DAVID KAYE: 
Ron and others, 
I think the example nicely establishes that the answer depends on the question you 
ask. You get a different LR if you ask a different question (compare a set of 
different hypotheses). That relevance is relative affects all plausible theories of 
how to determine whether a fact is relevant.  If a judge is asking, intuitively, “In 
light of everything known at the moment of decision on an objection, would a 
reasonable juror find this item of evidence E helpful?” the judge needs to consider 
what stories the juror could reasonably consider.  E will be relevant to deciding 
between some pairs of these alternative constructions of the events but not to 
other comparisons.  This may be awkward, but it affects all plausible theories of 
relevance.  At least, I think it does. 
Incidentally, like Sam, I present the likelihood ratio briefly in a general 
Evidence class, as one way to think about one aspect of circumstantial evidence—
a way that some students will find congenial and others will find perplexing.  As 
15    D.  Michael  Risinger,  Inquiry,  Relevance,  Rules  of  Exclusion  and  Evidentiary  Reform,  75 
BROOK. L. REV. 1355 (2010). 
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reasoning than this.  And as you and Michael Pardo (and L. Jonathan Cohen, 
among others) have argued, the formalism begs deeper epistemological questions. 
BRUCE HAY: 
What  I  don’t  think  has  been  sufficiently  emphasized  in  this  very  interesting 
discussion is the difference between the judge’s and jury’s tasks.  As I understand 
things,  a  judge  doesn’t  have  to,  and  indeed  should  not,  decide  whether  (she 
thinks) a piece of evidence makes a fact more or less likely; rather, she has to 
decide whether a reasonable trier of fact might consider it to have that effect. 
Ron’s  conundrum—the  piece  of  evidence  that  seems  (to  the  judge)  to  point 
equally to guilt and innocence—doesn’t raise any admissibility problem, unless 
all reasonable jurors would have to see the evidence the way the judge does; in 
the  examples  we’ve  discussed,  reasonable  minds  could  disagree  about  the 
evidence’s valence, especially after hearing the stories the lawyers will try to spin 
around  it,  as  Sam  points  out.   That  is  why  ambivalent  evidence  is  routinely 
admitted.   This  doesn’t  contradict  the  Bayesian  approach  to  relevance;  it  just 
complicates  it  by  forcing  judges  to  be  second-order  Bayesians,  i.e.,  asking 
themselves  whether  a  Bayesian  juror  might  reasonably  assign  the  evidence  a 
likelihood ratio other than 1.    
MICHAEL PARDO: 
Dear Bruce, David, Ron, and others: 
Assuming  this  discussion  is  not  yet  exhausted,  I  have  a  quick  follow-up  to 
Bruce’s message, which I hope will clarify what I think the central dispute is in 
the exchange between David and Ron.    
Even when we move (thanks to Bruce’s clarification) to the second-order 
question of what any reasonable fact-finder could conclude, the same problem 
arises  for  the  Likelihood  Ratio  theory.   Again,  I  think  we  could  construct 
numerous examples in which two features hold (which I take to be Ron’s initial 
point):  (1) evidence is relevant, and (2) no reasonable fact-finder could decide 
that the evidence supports one side’s theory over the other side’s theory.  For 
example,  suppose  the  evidence  at  issue  is  that  a  fight  occurred  and  the  only 
dispute is over who started it.  If you think this example doesn’t work, any that 
meets the above two conditions will do.  If such examples exist, then this is a 
potential problem for the LR theory—it means that either the LR theory is false or 
that our conclusions (intuitions, considered judgments, or whatever) about what 
evidence is relevant and when have to change. 
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a problem for any theory of relevance or probative value.   But, the explanatory 
theory  that  Ron  and  I  have  argued  for  does  not  suffer  from  this  problem 
(although, as Ron notes, it may suffer from other problems).  In the fight example 
above,  for  example,  the  evidence  is  relevant  because  it  is  part  of  each  side’s 
explanation, even if it cannot be used to rationally distinguish between them.  
Please note that this is not meant to suggest that the LR theory cannot explain 
other cases or be useful as a teaching tool, as other have suggested. 
If you’ve read this far—thank you. 
PETER TILLERS: 
Dear Michael & All, 
I am no mathematician.  I am not even a logician.  But I feel safe in saying that it 
is important to be precise about mathematics and formal logic. 
“If such examples exist, then this is a potential problem for the LR 
theory—it means that either the LR theory is false…” 
Do  you  mean  to  say  that  such  examples  establish  the  mathematical 
invalidity of the ratio known as the likelihood ratio? 
No, you don’t mean that. 
You mean to say that a particular “interpretation”—or in the jargon of 
non-mathematicians, “application,” or “use”—of the likelihood ratio is “false.” 
It is true that one can use Bayes’ Theorem—one can “interpret” it—in a 
way  that  contravenes  common  sense.    It  is  also  true  that  the  use  of  Bayes’ 
Theorem  in  a  particular  real-world  context  (e.g.,  trial  by  jury)  may  not  be 
enlightening.  Sometimes, in short, doing a “Bayesian number” on some problem 
of evidence is a waste of time from almost any point of view.  But suggestions 
that particular interpretations of Bayes’ Theorem are “false” are overly strong.  
Such  suggestions  imply,  though  they  do  not  expressly  say,  that  a  determined 
Bayesian just could not recast a Bayesian analysis of this or that putative counter-
example  (but  a  counter-example  of  what  precisely?)  in  a  way  that  makes  a 
Bayesian “interpretation” consistent with the putative counter-example.  This is a 
strong claim that requires very strong evidence. 
BTW:  There are quite respectable people who combine Bayesian analysis 
with  “explanations.”    Indeed,  David  Schum  has  written  two  books  that  are 
practically  all  about  that.  See,  e.g.,  his  EVIDENTIAL  FOUNDATIONS  OF 
PROBABILISTIC REASONING (1994).  (This book is a classic.)  In a recent article I 
refer  to  Schum-style  inference  networks  as  “NAGs,”  networks  cum 
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Universal  Principles  or  Forms  of  Evidential  Inference? i n  J .   JACKSON,  M. 
LANGER  &  P.  TILLERS, E D S .,  CRIME,  PROCEDURE, A N D  EVIDENCE  IN  A 
COMPARATIVE  AND  INTERNATIONAL  CONTEXT  (Hart,  2008)  & 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1079235. 
Bayesian analysis is compatible, not only with much vice, but also with 
great (epistemological & inferential) virtue. 
N.B. Bayesianism is (among other things) a kind of logic.  As Michael 
Risinger mentioned, this kind of logic can be applied (sometimes but not always 
profitably) without the use of any numbers.  (Quantitative verbal expressions are 
not quite the same thing as numbers.) 
* * * 
I thought that David Kaye already made the key point:  Bayesian analysis 
is the tip of an iceberg of thought.  Arguments that there is, actually, an iceberg 
below  the  iceberg’s  tip—and  I  most  certainly  do  believe  that  there  are  many 
different non-Bayesian strategies for analyzing evidence (I have been riding this 
particular hobby horse for precisely 23 years!)—are, pardon the expression, old 
hat—and are, by now, trivial and uninteresting. 
* * * 
The above comments may sound a bit stentorian.  I hope you folks will 
forgive me for that.  I am in a rush to make the discussion of the uses and limits of 
Bayesian logic a bit more precise.  Of course, I was in rush to do that 20+ years 
ago.    See  P.  Tillers  &  E.  Green,  EVIDENCE  AND  INFERENCE  IN  THE  LAW  OF 
EVIDENCE:  THE  USES  AND  LIMITS  OF  BAYESIANISM ( 1 9 8 8 ) ,  a n  o f f s h o o t  o f  
Symposium on Evidence and Inference in the Law of Evidence:  The Uses and 
Limits of Bayesianism, 66 B.U. L. Rev. Nos. 3-4 (1986).  It appears that I have 
failed. 
Now I will do my very best to retire from this over-heated fray.  (We are 
plainly in the midst of a Forty Years’ War, not just a Thirty Years’ War.  Indeed, 
some historically-minded observers contend that the war has been going on since 
the 18th century.  Some observers—e.g., Jim Franklin—even think that precursors 
of this War can be found in antiquity.  See, e.g., Aristotle on the limits of his own 
invention, the syllogism. 
MICHAEL S.  PARDO: 
Dear Peter, 
I did not mean to suggest that the examples show the mathematical invalidity of 
anything.  I meant that the LR theory of relevance is false as a description or 
explanation of when juridical evidence is relevant.  My point is a general one that, 
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just the LR theory).  If (1) any theory implies answers as to when an item of 
evidence is relevant/irrelevant; and (2) there is a mismatch between those answers 
and  our  considered  judgments  about  what  judges  and  jurors  will/ought  to 
conclude about whether the evidence is relevant; then (3) that theory is false as a 
description or explanation of relevance.  (Of course, it might also turn out that the 
theory  provides  better  conclusions  and  so  we  should  abandon  the  underlying 
judgments.)   
In short, I was trying to clarify a methodological point in the debate, not 
making  any  substantive  claims  about  the  formal  validity  of  likelihood  ratios, 
Bayes’ Theorem, or any other analysis.  I also did not mean to imply that there is 
something incompatible between probabilistic analysis or reasoning of any kind 
and explanation-based accounts of legal proof; there’s not. 
PETER TILLERS: 
Michael, ok, mea culpa   
PETER TILLERS: 
Dear Friends & Colleagues, 
Although I do not agree with everything Michael Pardo says (I don’t agree with 
anyone about everything), I think Michael Pardo is one of the most thoughtful 
commentators on Evidence.  And, incidentally (or not so incidentally), he pays 
attention to neuroscience.  This is good:  people who worry about the workings of 
inference should worry (or think) about the workings of the brain. 
P.S. Watch out: the Evidence community will yet turn into a love-fest. 
DAVID KAYE: 
Thanks,  Mike,  for  trying  to  focus  the  discussion.   I  have  some  further 
clarifications: 
1.  Ron said or implied that a Bayesian theory does not work because it 
requires “omniscient Bayesian judges (and jurors, I guess) who do not suffer from 
the informational vulnerabilities that we mere mortals do,” and he complained 
that  I  did  not  address  this  point.   I  did  not  claim  that  real  judges  are  like 
Dworkin’s Hercules or other idealizations.  I noted that the judge has to do the 
best he or she can in considering the scenarios that reasonably come to mind at 
each  stage  of  the  trial,  given  the  information  and  intelligence  at  the  judge’s 
disposal and the arguments of counsel.  The judge will have plenty of clues as to 
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general knowledge of the world, and a party’s explanations of why the proffered 
evidence is relevant all will help.  In the same manner, a judge “inferring to the 
best explanation” will do his or her best in making rulings at each point in time.  
As  I  suggested,  the  problem  of  limited  information  and  cognitive  capacity  is 
something any theory has to deal with if it is supposed to model the behavior of 
real  judges,  jurors,  or  advocates.   A  Dworkinian  Hercules  is  not  a  realistic 
construct, but rather is a normative ideal or a heuristic device.  A judge need not 
be clever enough to imagine every conceivable narrative to conclude, as Sam did, 
that in every account of events that will matter as the trial unfolds, some facts 
probably are important.  Or a judge may discover, as the trial develops, that what 
initially appeared to be relevant (or didn’t) is relevant (or isn’t).  Probabilities are 
conditioned  on  prior  information,  and  as  that  information  changes  so  do  the 
probabilities that fit into likelihood ratios.  This is not an embarrassment.  It is the 
human condition, which lacks precognition and omniscience.  There is nothing 
theoretically disturbing with a judge thinking, “If I had known then what I know 
now, I would (or would not) have admitted that evidence.” 
2.   Mike  emphasizes  another  point  (closer  to  the  starting  point  of  the 
discussion)—that “the LR theory is false” because evidence can be relevant if “it 
is  part  of  each  side’s  explanation,  even  if  it  cannot  be  used  to  rationally 
distinguish between them.”  This criticism assumes that “LR theory” means that 
the only criterion for relevance is a likelihood ratio.  It is clear from Lempert’s 
original article and both editions of his casebook that this is not the LR theory he 
propounded.  To tie together the threads of the explanations that Roger, Sam, 
Bruce, Peter, and I (and anyone else I may have unintentionally overlooked) have 
offered in this exchange of ideas, let me, once again, distinguish between two 
types of evidence—(a) circumstantial evidence and (b) evidence that fills out a 
narrative.  (Of course, some evidence can fall into both categories.)   
a.  Lempert  introduced  the  likelihood  ratio  to  explain  the  relevance  of 
circumstantial facts.  How is it that a blood stain or a prior conviction is relevant?  
His answer was that it changed the odds of a material fact by an amount given by 
the  likelihood  ratio.   Some  circumstantial  facts  can  have  this  effect  within 
conflicting narratives.  One side says that the fact makes the conclusion it wants 
to draw stronger (the son loved the father, so he would not kill him).  The other 
side says it makes the opposite conclusion stronger (the son wanted to get the 
father’s  estate  sooner,  so  he  killed  him).   In  both  narratives  being  the  son  as 
opposed  to  an  unrelated  individual  matters  and  affects  the  probability  of  a 
material conclusion.  It matters in conjunction with other facts (which could be 
modeled in a Bayes net if desired).  So being the son is relevant on a Bayesian 
account,  because  the  judge  cannot  say  that  both  these  narratives  have  equal 
probability,  and  must  let  the  jurors  consider  these  and  any  other  competing 
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evidence that seemingly “cannot be used to rationally distinguish” two narratives. 
b.    The  other  category  of  relevant  evidence  on  a  Bayesian  (or  other) 
account is evidence that is relevant for some reason other than the fact that a 
reasonable juror could think it has a likelihood ratio that differs from unity.  This 
evidence  is  of  two  types.   (i)  Some  of  it  is  derivatively  relevant.   Charts, 
photographs, some real evidence, etc., are relevant if they help the jury understand 
other relevant evidence.  (ii) Other relevant evidence is for narrative integrity, to 
give color and depth to the narratives.  Proper names of witnesses fall into this 
category.  No Bayesian ever contended that evidence in category (b) cannot be 
relevant.
 16   After all, it helps a Bayesian (or other) factfinder in evaluating the 
probabilities of each side’s reconstruction of the events. 
ROGER PARK: 
Gee, I never thought the restyled evidence rules would take us this deep.  
The  way  I  understand  the  messages,  even  those  who  say  that  the 
likelihood ratio doesn’t capture the heart of the matter or that sometimes evidence 
with a likelihood ratio of 1.0 ought to be admissible don’t go so far as to say that 
thinking in terms of likelihood ratios is always useless.  
It seems to me that when interpreting Rule 401’s provision that “evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence,” it must be OK to think about whether the evidence being 
offered renders a fact more probable.  If that’s true, then it seems to me that it’s 
also OK to  think about  whether we’d be more likely to find the evidence if the 
fact were true than if it were not.    
With  regard  to  ambiprobative  evidence  (e.g., the  victim  was  the 
defendant’s father), it seems to me that Bruce Hay’s solution (below) works.   In 
other instances an item of evidence tags along just because it helps us understand 
16 I put it this way in McCormick: 
[L]eeway is allowed even on direct examination for proof of facts that merely 
fill in the background of the narrative and give it interest, color, and lifelikeness. 
Maps,  diagrams,  charts,  and  videotapes  can  be  material  as  aids  to  the 
understanding of other material evidence. Moreover, the parties may question 
the credibility of the witnesses and, within limits, produce evidence assailing 
and supporting their credibility. [¶] The second aspect of relevance is probative 
value, the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to 
prove. 
1 McCormick, supra note 11, § 185. The likelihood ratio merely captures the probative value of 
circumstantial evidence. Id.
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it’s hard to explain why it has a likelihood ratio different from 1.0 if you consider 
it in isolation, it’s certainly entitled to be admitted if it helps us understand other 
evidence that does move the needle.   The same can be said of evidence such as 
names.   Having a way to identify the various actors helps us understand other 
evidence. 
RONALD  ALLEN: 
Dear All, 
David  Kaye  is  correct  that  for  Bayes’  theorem  to  be  more  than  of  minor 
significance  for  understanding  juridical  proof  we  would  have  to  surmount 
cognitive and informational limits that are in fact insurmountable, but that was not 
my  point  in  my  previous  email.  My  point  picked  up  on  Sam  Gross  who 
hypothesized that the information needed to run Bayesian analysis usually doesn’t 
exist.  David’s answer to that was Bayesian judges who, for that to be a coherent 
answer,  need  the  information  that  Sam  Gross  hypothesized  doesn’t  typically 
exist.  In short, David’s answer didn’t address the point Prof. Gross was making, 
it seemed to me.  However, from the need to surmount insurmountable cognitive 
and informational limits, we can know from conceptual analysis that (dare I say 
it?) Bayesianism is false as a theory designed to predict outcomes about or to 
explain  or  discover  the  nature  of  juridical  proof  and  the  reasoning  process  at 
trial—false as an empirical matter.  “False” here means, as was perfectly clear in 
Mike Pardo’s email it seems to me, not very helpful as an explanation of the data, 
for predicting outcomes, or discovering knowledge about the matter in question. 
 Nor does it serve the other intellectual virtue of justification.  To be sure, even 
false  theories  can  be  useful  in  some  ways,  and  their  operations  sometimes 
intersect  truth.   Two  good  examples  are  the  theory  that  the  earth  is  flat  and 
Newtonian physics.  Both are internally consistent and quite useful, but both are 
false (some argue that Newtonian physics is a special case rather than false but 
that  takes  us  into  different  epistemological  waters).   Compare  them  to  the 
phlogiston theory of combustion, which again is internally consistent but not very 
useful,  although  some  of  its  predictions  overlap  oxygen  theory  (and  actually 
historically phlogiston theory apparently played an important contributory role in 
advancing knowledge). 
In David’s most recent email, he again doesn’t address the questions that I 
at least thought were being posed.  These have to do with what I referred to earlier 
in the thread as the massive overlap of proof at most trials.  His response is to give 
an example where the inferences drawn may distinguish the cases of the parties, 
but  the  problem  is  with  the  “massive”  amount  of  evidence  which  is  not  like 
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examples capture an essential feature of what needs to be explained if in fact it is 
true that evidence massively overlaps.  The claim is that a substantial amount of 
and maybe most evidence that is admitted in courts in the US is of the overlap 
kind which cannot be explained by a likelihood ratio approach, because the same 
evidence and the same inferences are critical parts of both stories (there was a 
fight, or there was a car crash).  If that claim is true, then the likelihood approach 
is (dare I say it again?) a false empirical theory because it explains very little.  It is 
simply unresponsive to that point to hypothesize that there may be evidence that 
is not of the overlap variety. 
Maybe like Newtonian physics, the use of Bayes’ Theorem is as a special 
case limited to those proffers that may distinguish the cases.  Fine with me, but it 
bears  mentioning  again  that  there  is  nothing  particularly  Bayesian  in  either 
comparative or counterfactual reasoning.  They are tools employed in Bayesian 
reasoning but in other forms of reasoning as well.  Nonetheless, if using either 
tool makes one a Bayesian, then we are indeed all Bayesians, although like most 
evidence at trial this doesn’t distinguish being a Bayesian from much else. 
What does distinguish Bayesian reasoning in an interesting way (for our 
purposes, but there are others, such as the disputes about the merits of hypothesis 
testing  and  so  on)  is  the  formal  manipulation  of  conditional  probabilities 
operating on mathematical probabilities or the maintenance of the consistency of 
a fully specified set of beliefs under certain conditions.  That takes us back to Sam 
Gross’s point that the normal condition of the legal system is the absence of both.  
The  normal  reason  why  a  judge  will  conclude  “some  facts  are  probably 
important” is that they are critical to one of the parties’ explanations and not 
because they distinguish that explanation from any other or because even a rough 
and  ready  application  of  Bayes’  Theorem  generates  an  updated  prior.   That 
determination  is  quite  straight  forward,  and  again  consistent  with  what  one 
observes at trials.  At least that is my and I believe Mike’s claim.  And if facts do 
distinguish one case from another, I agree one can give the reasoning process an 
informal Bayesian cast, as one can give it other casts as well.  That leaves the 
Bayesian explanation consistent with other explanations for a small slice of what 
is being examined and inconsistent with a larger portion of it. 
ROGER PARK: 
Bruce said:  “As I understand things, a judge doesn’t have to, and indeed should 
not, decide whether (she thinks) a piece of evidence makes a fact more or less 
likely; rather, she has to decide whether a reasonable trier of fact might consider it 
to have that effect.” 
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Even  when  we  move  (thanks  to  Bruce’s  clarification)  to  the 
second-order  question  of  what  any  reasonable  fact-finder  could 
conclude, the same problem arises for the Likelihood Ratio theory.  
Again, I think we could construct numerous examples in which 
two  features  hold  (which  I  take  to  be  Ron’s  initial  point):    (1) 
evidence is relevant, and (2) no reasonable fact-finder could decide 
that the evidence supports one side’s theory over the other side’s 
theory.  For example, suppose the evidence at issue is that a fight 
occurred and the only dispute is over who started it.  If you think 
this  example  doesn’t  work,  any  that  meets  the  above  two 
conditions will do.  If such examples exist, then this is a potential 
problem for the LR theory—it means that either the LR theory is 
false or that our conclusions (intuitions, considered judgments, or 
whatever)  about  what  evidence  is  relevant  and  when  have  to 
change. 
It seems to me that it’s actually very hard to construct hypos in which a 
reasonable jury could only find equipoise.   One can hypothesize that the crucial 
issue  is  whether  the coin  came  up  heads  or  tails,  and  the  coin  fell  into  the 
drainpipe while being flipped.  Or that there are two equidistant holes in the fence 
through which the cow could have traveled, and only one of them would make the 
railroad liable.  But these cases are oddities.  (Moreover, they are cases in which a 
directed verdict should be granted on grounds that the evidence is insufficient to 
support a finding.)  Though we usually don’t think of them as cases where the 
evidence should be excluded on relevancy grounds, such cases are so unusual 
(and the sufficiency ruling is such a suitable alternative to exclusion of evidence) 
that we haven’t really had much reason to give thought to it.  My take on it would 
be that the better approach for the judge would be to admit the evidence and then 
rule on sufficiency at the end of the case, because something might turn up that 
does render the evidence relevant.   Maybe there will be circumstantial evidence 
about, say, the position of the cow on the railroad track or marks on the fence at 
one of the holes that does give the jury a basis for choosing between theories 
when all the evidence is in.  
It seems to me that in Mike’s fight hypo, there will be something different 
about the contesting eyewitnesses that would allow a legitimate argument that the 
jury could reasonably believe one over the other.   
Admittedly, some credibility contests are basically ineffable.  But I’d hate 
to  give  judges  the  role  of  sorting  those  out  from  others.   In  most  cases  of 
credibility contests, it seems to me that the approach of saying that the issue is 
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consequence more likely is a coherent way of viewing the admissibility issue.  
So, it still seems to me that asking whether the evidence could be viewed 
by the jury as making a fact more likely is a workable way of thinking about 
relevance, especially if we add that other evidence that helps understand relevant 
evidence (such as the floor plan of the bank) is also admissible. 
DAVID KAYE: 
Dear readers (offline responses indicate that there are still a few out there), 
I suspect that the extent of the disagreement between Ron and me in this thread is 
less than meets the eye, but I’ll add a few words of defense against Ron’s charge 
that  my  reconciliation  of  Sam’s  observations  with  a  Bayesian  account  of 
relevance  overlooks  something  crucial.   Ron  writes  that  “Sam  Gross  ... 
hypothesized that the information needed to run Bayesian analysis usually doesn’t 
exist,” and that I “didn’t address the point Prof. Gross was making.…” 
Sam wrote the following: 
More  important  item:    Defendant  in  a  murder  case  is  the  dead 
victim’s son.  Is that relevant to show he's guilty?  Is it relevant to 
show he’s innocent?  The answer in any such trial will be Yes, to 
both questions.  But why (as a Bayesian matter)?  I don’t have a 
clue, although we can all come up with lots of scenarios—he loved 
his father and would never harm him, he hated his father’s guts, he 
lived with his father and therefore was nearby when someone else 
killed the old man, his father drove him crazy, and so forth.  As far 
as “relevance” goes, it doesn't matter: the stark reality of the trial 
will be that whatever wall an advocate may try to sell to the jury, it 
better include this fact as a brick.” 
I responded that Sam actually gave the information a Bayesian approach 
requires.  If all the scenarios or narratives (the walls) that connect a mass of facts 
(the bricks) contain the fact in question (the same brick), then a Bayesian judge (a 
metaphor, not a description of reality), as I put it, “should treat the relationship as 
relevant under Rule 401 [because] there are one or more scenarios such that (1) a 
juror reasonably could worry about the scenario, and (2) a juror reasonably could 
believe that the defendant’s relationship as the son shifts the probability for the 
scenario or for any material propositions within it.”  I added that other facts that 
are part of the narratives that the parties propose or that jurors might construct 
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meaning,  form,  and  structure  to  Sam’s  walls—a  condition  that  is  entirely 
consistent with the Bayesian use of likelihood ratios to explain the relevance of 
circumstantial evidence. 
To which Ron replies: 
In  David’s  most  recent  email,  he  again  doesn’t  address…the 
massive  overlap  of  proof  at  most  trials….The  claim  is  that  a 
substantial amount of and maybe most evidence that is admitted in 
courts in the US is of the overlap kind that cannot be explained by 
a  likelihood  ratio  approach  because  the  same  evidence  and  the 
same inferences are critical parts of both stories (there was a fight, 
or there was a car crash). 
The response was implicit if not explicit in my previous explanations.  The 
walls can be massive—they can be full of bricks that both parties use (or that 
anyone else who is engaged in a rational reconstruction of the events will use).  
There can be one undisputed fact or one thousand.  The Bayesian analysis (at least 
the one that I proposed) is the same.  The judge admits suitable proof of all the 
important  facts—the  ones  needed  or  useful  in  developing  a  series  of  rich, 
comprehensible, and convincing alternative narratives.  (To a Bayesian, some are 
useful because they change important likelihood ratios, while others are useful for 
other reasons.)  Such overlapping facts—massive or minuscule in quantity—are 
not a bad or incomprehensible thing to the Bayesian judge or juror any more (or 
less) than they are for the inference-to-the-best-explanation judge or juror.  Both 
engage in deciding which of the metaphorical walls is (probably) real, and both 
need a web of information for that purpose.  
If this theory is false like Newtonian physics (useful in getting the Space 
Shuttle  into  the  right  orbit)  or  even  a  flat-earth  theory  (useful  for  local 
navigation), then so be it.  Likelihood ratios help me think more clearly about the 
probative value of certain kinds of evidence.  That’s good enough for me.
17  
17 As examples of such reasoning, consider Richard Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA as 
Criminal Identification Evidence:  With Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 303-
341 (1991); Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Probative 
Value  of  Expert  Testimony  in  Child  Sexual  Abuse  Cases, 8 2  C ORNELL  L.  REV.  43  (1996); 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN 
UPDATE, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996). 
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My topic:  Bovine Ruminations 
Roger  wrote:    “…One  can  hypothesize  that…there  are  two  equidistant 
holes in the fence through which the cow could have traveled, and only one of 
them would make the railroad liable.” 
Let’s picture this bovine problem this way: 
Stipulation:  The issue:  Did the cow go through Gap A or did the cow not go 
through Gap A? 
Now, we might take Cow at Point X at T-1 and Cow at Point Y at T-2 as 
our evidence E [E = Cow at Point X at Time 1 & at Point Y at Time 2] that the 
cow went through Gap A—Ha—or that the cow did not do so, not-Ha. 
One way to tackle this problem is to view it as a competition between two 
scenarios:  Scenario 1: the Cow went from Point X at T-1 to Gap A to Point Y at 
T-2.  Scenario 2: the cow went from X through B to Y. 
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Suppose that the evidence is that in the interval between T-1 and T-2 the apparent 
brightness of Sirius [a nearby star] increased and decreased by one magnitude.  
Result: equipoise? 
We might formulate the factual issue this way: 
P(Ha|E)? 
Now we might ask (if we are good Bayesians), what’s the probability of E 
(cow at X at T-1 & cow at Y at T-2) assuming Ha (the cow passed through Gap 
A), and what’s the probability of E assuming, or given, not-Ha (the cow did not 
pass through Gate A, which might be, in someone’s mind, the probability that the 
cow passed through Gap B).  Or: 
What are the comparative values of P(E) in the following two situations: 
To figure out the above probabilities, we might make some guesses. 
For  example,  you—the  trial  judge—might  guess  that  cows—and    you 
think this is a cow like any other—like to take the shortest route between two 
points (but that cows can’t or won’t jump over fences). 
But you, the trial judge, might also say to yourself, “But maybe cows also 
tend to walk away from trees to some degree.” 
One  question  is  whether  the  trial  judge’s  personal  beliefs  about  these 
potential bovine behavior-influencing factors should determine the comparative 
values of P(E|Ha) and P(E|not-Ha) for purposes of admissibility. 
In the mode of thinking given above, the trial judge apparently wants to 
combine the two principles to construct a model of bovine self-locomotion in the 
situation involved here.  But suppose that the trial judge instead says to herself, 
“You know, I think one principle or another governs bovine walking, and I’ve got 
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change the way the judge thinks about and derives the conditional probabilities of 
E  given  Ha  and,  alternatively,  given  not-Ha?    Or  suppose  the  judge  says  to 
herself:    “You  know,  my  task  is  to  weigh  the  relative  probabilities  of  two 
scenarios, Scenario 1 given E and Scenario 2 given E (and I don’t see any other 
possible scenarios here that have any perceptible chance of having happened).” 
In any of the above mental-world situations is there anything that militates 
against the judge’s or the jurors’ interest in or the importance of the bottom line, 
the value, in their minds, of P(E|Ha) compared to the value of P(E|not-Ha)? 
Collateral point:  In any of the above situations, is it possible that numbers 
(probability values) might be attached to some or all of the ancillary principles in 
play? 
In the situation (above) in which the trial judge sees two causal factors at 
play, can and perhaps should the trial judge say, “Well, that’s my opinion.  But a 
reasonable jury might have a different opinion about the vector that those two 
variables produce, and I’ll let the jury decide how those two variables combine to 
determine how cows probably behave in this situation.  In any case, however, no 
matter  what  bottom  line  conclusion  the  jury  or  I  might  reach  about  the 
combination of the two [or more] causal variables, I think that both I and the jury 
should hear the evidence and then ponder how the shortest-distance-between-two-
points-principle and the tree-aversion-principle [and any other such principles] 
combine”? 
* * * 
I was going to add other questions & refinements. But I have grown weary 
(physically). So I’ll stop.  I can only pray that you can see roughly where I’m 
heading with all of this. 
RONALD  ALLEN: 
Peter has given (yet another) example where there are two competing stories, and 
maybe (but I doubt it) where the evidence distinguishes them.  What distinguishes 
them if anything does is people’s background knowledge (which personally and 
idiosyncratically  I  view  as  “evidence,”  but  that’s  another  matter).   No  one  is 
claiming such cases do not exist; indeed it is remarkable that we have to keep 
saying this.  So, let me say it again:  Such cases exist.  The claim is that other 
cases exist where the evidence is critical to both parties’ explanation but does not 
distinguish them.  It is simply a logical error to think that claiming the first set 
exists has much to do with the second set.   
As to Peter’s hypothetical, I don’t think it shows what he thinks it does.  If 
that  is  all  the  evidence  there  is,  and  unless  one  can  in  fact  on  the  basis  of 
background knowledge infer with great than a .5 probability what the cow would 
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party with the burden of proof.  If there is background knowledge about cow 
behavior so that one can knowledgeably draw an inference about the cow, then 
Peter’s  hypothetical  is  not  what  he  thinks  it  is  for  it  is  then  not  a  case  of 
equipoise.   If  there  is  not  such  knowledge,  the  only  way  to  avoid  a  directed 
verdict would be expert witness testimony about cows or particularized evidence 
about this particular cow. 
Peter Tillers: 
To  complete  my  ruminations  about  partial  quantification  of  the 
peregrinations of a possibly-ruminating cow: 
The problem, you will recall, is this: 
Stipulated issue:  Did the cow go through Gap A or did the cow not go through 
Gap A? 
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tendencies.  One tendency might have been to seek to avoid trees to some extent.  
Another tendency may be to seek the shortest route between Point X and Point Y. 
But  now  assume  that  cows—including  this  one—also  perhaps  have  a 
tendency—a disposition or character trait, if you like—to amble toward the right 
rather than toward the left (all things being equal, of course). 
You see the pickle we’re in:  there is a possibility that the tree-aversion 
tendency and the walk-to-the-right (do cows “walk”?) tendency have equal and 
opposite causal force.  So perhaps the two tendencies produce a wash.  Or perhaps 
they don’t produce a wash because perhaps they don’t have equal force, because 
both tendencies can’t be at work at the same time, or because…of something else.  
Whatever the trial judge thinks, perhaps the judge should let the jury (if there is 
one) decide what’s what.  (Judicial meta-analysis is what is at work here, yes?) 
I know you’ll be happy to hear that this is my last word about cows. 
PAUL KIRGIS: 
But why should we talk about past events in terms of probabilities?  Assume we 
want to know whether one card that has already been flipped over is a red queen.  
The suit and number of that card is not a probable event—the card flipped exists; 
it consists of one particular number and one particular suit.  Once the card has 
been flipped, chance is no longer involved.  It is what it is.  The fact that a human 
being doesn’t know the number and suit until it is turned over doesn’t somehow 
make that brute historical fact (assuming there is such a thing) an uncertain event. 
Clearly it makes sense to talk about our degree of certainty as to whether a 
past event happened, and maybe when we talk about “probabilities” of past events 
we mean nothing more than “confidence index.”  
Maybe we just use the notion of probabilities heuristically.  Much of the 
literature employing probabilities suggests that understanding.  But if that’s the 
case,  why  are  we  bound  by  the  math  of  probabilities?   In  other  words,  why 
measure  “confidence  index”  on  a  scale  of  zero  to  one?   Doing  so  might  be 
required only if it makes sense to think of confidence (or certainty) as some kind 
of discrete, finite condition, so that there really would be such as thing as being 
“100% certain.”  I know we occasionally say such things, but do we mean them 
literally?  I find it hard to accept that I have a tank labeled “CERTAINTY” in my 
head that could conceivably be exactly empty or exactly filled exactly to capacity. 
If there isn’t any reason to measure the “probability” of past events on a 
zero to one scale, then why get worked up about conundrums like the conjunction 
paradox?  
I wonder whether this problem doesn’t lie at the heart of Ron & Michael’s 
critique.  What we are really doing at trial is a type of Peircean abduction.  We’re 
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probabilistic  reasoning,  even  if  probabilistic  reasoning  bears  some  superficial 
similarity to what we are doing.  So it shouldn’t be a surprise that probabilistic 
reasoning loses it explanatory power when things get complex. 
I know Peter is very familiar with Peirce’s logic (as is David Schum), 
because  I  heard  it  from  them  years  ago.   So  Peter  (and  others)  may  have  a 
powerful response to this.  But it is the reason why I don’t deal in Bayesian theory 
in my Evidence class. 
DAVID KAYE: 
Dear Paul, 
Fundamental  or  foundational  is  an  apt  term  here.   You  are  opening  a  can  of 
worms that writhed in this list and in many publications!
18  The interpretations of 
standard probability theory that lend themselves to retrospective theories of legal 
factfinding  are  of  two  sorts—logical  and  subjective  (or  personal).
19  A s  y o u  
imply, frequentist theory has limited applicability, but we can have degrees of 
beliefs  (justified  or  merely  subjective) in  statements  about  events  that  already 
have occurred just as we can in statements about events that have yet to occur.  
The connection between partial beliefs and probabilities, and between probability 
and inductive reasoning, is the subject of rich literature.
20  Naturally, there are 
competing philosophical theories.  Finally, Jonathan Cohen and Ron Allen have 
written  provocatively  on  puzzles  involving  the  difficulties  of  reconciling  the 
sometimes  arbitrary  elements  of  causes  of  action  and  multiplication  of 
18  If you want to pursue the past-future distinction, see, for example, Vaughn C. Ball, The Moment 
of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. REV. 807 (1961), reprinted in 
ESSAYS ON PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 84, 101 (1961); Laurence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: 
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).  
19  See, ﾠe.g., D.H. Kaye, Introduction: What is Bayesianism? in PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN 
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE LIMITS AND USES OF BAYESIANISM 1 (Peter Tillers & Eric D. Green 
eds., 1988), reprinted as What is Bayesianism? A Guide for the Perplexed, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 161 
(1988). 
20   For a nice exposition of this connection, see BRIAN SKYRMS, CHOICE  AND CHANCE: AN 
INTRODUCTION  TO  INDUCTIVE  LOGIC ( 4 t h  e d .  2 0 0 0 ) ;  see  also W ESLEY  SALMON,  THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE (3d ed. 1986).   
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21  There have been responses from statisticians
22 as well 
as law professors.
23  
PETER TILLERS: 
Assuming that your ontology is correct -- events in the past either happened or 
they  didn’t—your  argument  is  tantamount  to  an  argument  for  a  “subjective 
interpretation” of probability—i.e., as you suggest, an interpretation that takes the 
view that probabilities are fundamentally about “belief states” or “credal states” 
and not about (except indirectly) events in the world. 
Another way to put your thesis:  For events in the past, probabilities are 
necessarily only subjective—they express our degree of certainty or uncertainty—
rather than stochastic or aleatory. 
The subjective probabilists—or some of them (e.g., de Finetti, Ramsey)—
went further and said that all probabilities are subjective (or “personal”) and that 
it  never  makes  any  sense  to  talk  about  probabilities  in  nature.    (Students  of 
quantum theory might or might not take issue with this more extreme thesis.) 
There has been a serious debate about how to grade subjective uncertainty. 
You are not alone in thinking that probability theory is not necessarily the only 
way to measure or grade subjective uncertainty or even a good way (although I 
think  that  almost  all  theorists  who  have  advocated  other  ways  of  measuring 
uncertainty have said that a Bayesian strategy can be a good way, that Bayesian 
logic sometimes works (in some sense)). 
Some  of  the  people  who  are  interested  in  the  conjunction  paradox  are 
interested in it because they think it amounts to a reductio ad absurdum either of 
probability theory or of a particular “interpretation” (application) of probability 
theory. 
I have stolen much of what little I know about probability theory from 
David Schum.  One of his central points about the probability calculus is that its 
usefulness  depends  on  the  structuring  of  a  problem:    a  problem  must  be 
formulated in a way that makes it tractable to probability computations.  (For 
21  E.g., L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND  THE PROVABLE (1977); Ronald J. Allen & 
Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Proof in Civil Cases: Algorithms vs. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL 
L. REV. 893
22   A.P. Dawid, The Difficulty About Conjunction, 36 THE STATISTICIAN 91 (1987). 
23  D.H. Kaye, Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to Understand Proof Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt?,  66  B.U.  L.  REV.  657  (1986)  (describing  the  connection  between  legal  elements  and 
narratives of events); Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723 (2001); 
Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 VA. L. REV. 
1551 (2001); cf. Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, 43 VT. L. REV. 469 (2009) 
(questioning the “relative plausibility” theory as a solution to the conjunction problem). 
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there are alternative (factual) hypotheses that are to some degree exclusive or 
complementary—that,  to  some  degree,  an  increase  in  the  probability  of  one 
hypothesis decreases—to some degree—the probability of other hypotheses that 
constitute  its  negation.    (I  add  qualifiers  such  as  “to  some  degree”  to 
accommodate hypotheses that are, to some extent, “fuzzy.”))  In general, I think 
David is correct about that. 
Note that David assumes that hypothesis formation—the development of 
hypotheses—is a process that cannot be described in terms of probability theory.  
This view gets into deep philosophical, epistemological, and inferential waters.  
Withal, I generally agree with David about this.  This is one of the reasons why I 
have bought into Peirce’s logic (if logic it is). 
In fairness, I do want to acknowledge that there have been Bayesians who 
disagree with Schum about hypothesis formation and who think that Bayesian 
logic  can  account  for  hypothesis  formation  and  that  we  ought  to  think  about 
hypothesis formation in Bayesian terms. 
To complicate matters further, consider one more point:  There are people 
who  (i)  buy  into  Peircean  logic  and  who  (like  David  and  me)  agree  that 
evidentiary details function as “signs” or “hints”; but (ii) think that the workings 
of such evidentiary hints can be described mathematically (there is a book called 
the “Mathematical Theory of Hints” and I believe the authors of that book use 
Shaferian logic & math). 
I have taught a course on fact investigation for quite a few years now.  I 
have my students “marshal” evidence in all sorts of ways.  But I rarely ask them 
to construct inference networks or to do a “Bayesian number” on an inference 
network (or even on just a simple, one-stage inference).  This is because during 
investigation my experience is that factual possibilities & issues are so fuzzy, ill-
developed, etc., that I genuinely cannot imagine how to do a useful Bayesian 
analysis of those problems; the investigations my students conduct are usually 
largely  exploratory;  the  students  are  trying  to  figure  what  the  (factual,  legal, 
chronological, etc.) issues are.  (There are exceptions, however; sometimes issues 
emerge that seem readily & usefully tractable to Bayesian analysis.) 
PETER TILLERS: 
Paul,  
An addendum:  even if we believe past events either happened or they did not, 
there is reason to think about the uncertainty of past events—about stochastic 
(real-world) chances (real-world random processes).  Suppose we know or believe 
Baby Joe was born in July of this year.  Given what we think we know about 
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gestation,  our  knowledge  of  those  chances  gives  us  a  basis  for  making  some 
guesses about the time of conception.  The language of the standard probability 
calculus gives us a coherent way of calculating and expressing our judgments 
about the chances of conception at various times.  
MICHAEL RISINGER: 
Dear Paul et al. 
I am moved to put my oar in again after this posting by Paul and the various 
commentaries that have followed it.  It is an opportunity to air a few foundational 
issues and be instructed by my betters for my sins.  
Paul’s position seems to me to make much too much out of the difference 
between past events and future events, both in terms of probability theory and 
general epistemology.  From the point of view of a bettor trying to guess the result 
of a coin flip in a separate room (heads, tails, or standing edgewise) based solely 
on probability information (and I take this to be all information at root base), it 
makes no difference whether the coin was flipped before the bet, or flipped after 
the bet.  And the prediction/post-diction distinction does not map on to epistemic 
warrant very well either.  There are plenty of predictions that are better warranted 
than  most  post-dictions.   There  may  be  certain  types  of  evidence  potentially 
available for post-dictions that are not available for predictions (claims of direct 
human observation, for instance) but they are often unavailable, and even when 
available they are fallible and therefore merely probabilistic.  Time’s arrow may 
run both ways in relativity equations.  It is unresolved whether that captures a 
fundamental reality, or needs a supplemental qualification.  Our instinct is that 
there is something fundamental about the difference between past and future, but 
from  a  general  probability  theory  perspective,  that  instinct  is  almost  certainly 
misplaced.   And  I  don’t  think  a  distinction  between  objective  and  subjective 
probability (or what is usually meant by the distinction when invoked) based on 
post-diction vs. prediction is tenable (although I am not clear on this because I 
find the very distinction unclear).  Rather the distinction, if it means anything at 
all, has to do with the formality of specifications and the hardness of the given 
base-rates generating the probability (in hypothetical systems) or the nature of the 
data generating the probability estimate (in the real world). 
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